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Through an exploratory approach, we studied the evolution, sustainability, and
management of ten microcredit institutions located in Gossas, a small town in
Senegal, Sub-Saharan Africa. Prevailing ideas about social capital, in the form of
social relationships within and between microcredit institutions and financing
NGOs, donors, and governments, are examined using both rational choice and
Marxist social capital theories to highlight the social struggles in social capital.
This study goes beyond a microcredit impact analysis by including an exploratory
institutional study to examine broader social and economic changes, including
the new institutional changes brought about by neoliberal reforms, the emerging
roles of women in rural and urban Senegal, and their increased political savoir
faire. This study concludes with recommendations on how to better leverage
microcredit and social capital to fill the vacuum left by restructuring of the welfare state through structural adjustment programs and neoliberal reforms.

T

he impact of microfinance on women’s decision-making
and empowerment has been the subject of several
studies in the last two decades. Many of these quantitative studies have focused on the impact of microfinance—with
a majority proving that microcredit increased the standard of
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living—raised awareness, aided decision making, and reduced
poverty among rural beneficiaries.1 Putnam (1993) forwards the
argument that dense associational networks within civil society
correlate positively with indicators of political democracy and economic growth. In fact, Putnam (1995) asserts that political malaise
and economic stagnation can be traced to declining stocks of social
capital in neighborhoods and communities. Thus, what we have
been seeing dominating development discourse in the last decade or
two is a shift from “basic needs” or welfare approaches to poverty
alleviation to an alternative approach using social capital manifested
in social networks and associational life as resources that could fuel
development from the bottom up (Rankin, 2002). When people
engage in networks and forms of associations such as microcredit
organizations, they develop a framework of common values and
beliefs that can become a “moral resource” (Putnam, 1993, p. 172).
Thus, as Rankin (2002) argues, social capital has been adopted as
the “magic bullet” with the power to correct state market failures
(Edwards, n.d.). This view has led to a worldwide consensus where
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) rooted in civil society and
mobilizing social capital are considered to be the most appropriate
institutions to carry out development work (Rankin, 2001).
However, NGOs are not a panacea and cannot solve the problems
facing developing nations alone. The role of states, albeit weak or corrupt, cannot be ignored. The case study of Gossas will be analyzed
using social capital theory, including the strength of ties between
poor communities and resource-giving (donor) communities and
between NGOs and political development in the third world.
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Neoliberal and Marxist Theories,
Social Capital, and Development
Social capital has been defined as “bonds of trust and mutual concern
that arise through volunteering, socializing, and taking part in organizations such as church and civic groups, bowling leagues, PTAs,
and professional association” (Koretz, 2001, p. 30). Social capital is
expected to pay off in many ways by promoting the transmission
of new ideas, improving children’s education, and enhancing the
efficiency of labor and capital markets. The previous examples of
social capital were given in the context of the USA. In the context
of Senegal, a developing country, social capital is manifested in
memberships in solidarity groups (which frequently help each other
to pull water, process grain, and access cooking ingredients and
cash), Women in Development projects, tontines,2 and diaras.3 In the
study area, social capital has been translated to contacts with northern
NGOs, government funding, and political affiliation. In the study
area it was found that women’s groups received “rewards and spoils” as
a result of the support accorded to the political regime. The important question we will try to answer is whether women who organize
themselves within microcredit organizations are able to build their
social capital and leverage themselves politically to receive “rewards
and spoils” for the socioeconomic development of their community.
Recent sociological research has attempted to address the weaknesses in the deterministic relationship between social capital and
development portrayed by Putnam. In 1998 Michael Woolcock, a
World Bank economist, developed a typology of different types of
social capital and their likely outcomes. Intracommunity ties (“bonding” social capital, or “integration”) are manifested at the macro level
with social opportunity requiring high levels of both integration and
linkage. The macropolitical framework can facilitate or impede the
capacity of communities to mobilize social networks. Woolcock goes
on to say that state institutions can have more or less institutional
capacity (“organizational integrity”) and be more or less responsive
to civil society (“synergy”). High levels of both are needed for states
to achieve the cooperation, accountability, and flexibility character-
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istic of successful developmental states such as Japan, South Korea,
and Singapore (Rankin, 2001, p. 5).
Rankin, building on the work of Marxist anthropologist Pierre
Bourdieu (1977), cautions that there is a struggle inherent in social
capital. She asserts that social capital has an ideological function
where the gestures of giving and kindness can function as a form of
domination, a “symbolic violence” with the harmful effect of binding
the oppressed to their oppressors through feelings of trust and obligation. This code of honor (credit, confidence, obligation, personal
loyalty, hospitality, gratitude, piety) is the most economical mode of
domination. Rankin therefore cautions that to the extent that development programs, such as the microcredit frenzy we are witnessing,
nourish local forms of association underpinned by common moral
frameworks, they risk exacerbating already existing lines of hierarchy,
coercion, and exclusion (2002, p. 8).
The World Bank, bilateral agencies, and NGOs have largely
adopted social capital within the liberal tradition as cultural properties, such as trust, norms, and networks that enhance efficiency by
facilitating cooperation finance. Rankin argues that mainstream
development agencies, who two decades ago used modernization
approaches to development and would have attacked such smallscale forms of petty capitalism as anachronistic “vestiges of traditional
society” that had no place in a modern society, now promote microfinance as a programmatic strategy that mobilizes social capital. This
change of strategy and targeting of poor women, when previously
credit inputs were extended to the male head of household in small
farming communities, is happening for several reasons.
The recent “career” of social capital to borrow an expression
from Margit Mayer (2001) coincides with the conclusion of the
Cold War, dubbed sympathetically by another social theorist,
Francis Fukuyama, as the “end of history” itself (Kanishka
Goonewardena 2000). Or that these events also paved the way
for other, somewhat lesser endings, including state-centered
planning and the comprehensive welfare state. Unmoored from
state institutions, development planners with the best of inten-
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tions must now turn to civil society to do their good work—
buttressed by policies and programs intended to devolve capacity to the local level. Much has been said about the
opportunities this political economic conjuncture presents for
grassroots mobilization, local self-reliance, participatory
processes, and development informed by local knowledge (e.g.
Mayer 1994). Without disputing the potential for such progressive outcomes, I wish to emphasize the extraordinary omission
in most of the social capital literature of the implications of this
conjuncture for the cherished local capacities, on the one hand,
or for the emergence of social capital as a politically expedient
concept for those setting the terms of the new world order, on the
other. (2001, p. 10, emphasis added.)
The social capital framework therefore enables the architects of
neoliberal economic policy to cast the reconfiguration of state-society
relations in progressive terms, such as local capacity building, local
self-reliance, net social benefits from reduced transaction costs, and
increased return to human capital. “As such, social capital can be
expected to fill the vacuum left by restructuring of the welfare state
in countries around the world” (Rankin, 2002, p. 10). These two
prevailing theories of social capital will be discussed further in the
context of our study area. Kabeer (1994) makes the argument that
the “feminization of development” we have been witnessing manifested as microfinance projects is justified on the basis of efficiency
and empowerment arguments drawing on the principles of social
capital theory. The social costs of neoliberal reforms and structural
adjustment, as discussed in our case study of Gossas, is disproportionately borne by women whose unpaid domestic labor absorbs
much of the shock suffered by poor households as a result of cuts in
health care, agricultural inputs, and educational subsidies. Women’s
labor therefore underwrites the transition in macroeconomic policy
from the Keynesian welfare state to the neoliberal “workfare” state
(Rankin, 2001; Jessop, 1994).
Rural women in agrarian economies similar to our case study in
Gossas typically lack the collateral, literacy, numeracy, and freedom
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of mobility necessary to access conventional credit from banks and
other lending agencies. Women tend to spend disproportionately
more of their incomes on the welfare of the household and exhibit
higher repayment and lower default rates (Rankin, 2002; Jessop,
1994). The argument being made is that extending credit to women
for microenterprise development will lead to beneficial outcomes for
all household members, poor communities, and lenders themselves
(Morduch, 2000), through social capital garnered due to membership in borrower groups, which helps to correct for imperfect
information, borrowers’ lack of access to formal credit, employment
histories, and substitutes for collateral by ensuring against default
through social sanction and peer enforcement (Rankin, 2002,
p. 12). Therefore, by participating in a network of borrower groups,
poor women are empowered through new forms of bridging and
linking social capital.
Microfinance advocates drawing on liberal theories of social
capital in their approach to poverty alleviation, according to Rankin
(2002) are able to evoke feminist and union traditions by coining
expressions such as “solidarity groups” to describe women’s borrower
groups. By making such expressions, the implication is that
women’s associations through microfinance generate not just social
and economic capital but also collective consciousness and resistance
to oppression. In practice, however, microfinance models propounded by multilaterals and bilaterals focus more on lenders’ concerns about financial sustainability and profits rather than on getting
involved in the more difficult task of building radical collective
action. In other words, solidarity groups allow lenders to slash
administrative costs, motivating repayment by using peer pressure to
introduce financial discipline. Staff and founders of microcredit
institutions are more concerned about outreach and repayment rates
and are not engaged in building collective consciousness (Rankin,
2001, 2002; Ackerly, 1997; Goertz, 1997).
The assertions above will be tested in the case of Gossas. The
intent is to investigate whether some level of consciousness or
savoir faire is evoked as women become part of microcredit groups.
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This point will be discussed further later when we look at microcredit in Gossas.

The Strengths of Ties
Apart from managing the social struggles inherent in social capital,
another major challenge for NGOs is that they must perform two
different functions in order to be effective: (1) generate financial
resources with which to (2) give microcredits to their membership.
These two functions require them to bridge two very different
constituencies: other NGOs, especially those located in the north,
government-owned nonprofits operating in the domain of microfinance, or donors and the relatively resource-poor world of marginalized farmers, urban squatters, and women who can use these loans
and other resources to improve their own lives. Ashman, Brown, and
Zwick (1998) argue that this challenge of bridging these divergent
organizational environments of resource mobilization and grant
making can be managed by building and maintaining relationships
with people and organizations in both the environments through
which Civil Society Resource Organizations (CSROs) gain the
resources, information, and social legitimacy necessary for accomplishing their missions. The same kind of challenge is faced by
microcredit organizations.
NGOs in the small rural town of Gossas are deeply involved
in building social capital across diverse environments (donor/governmental grant-making institutions and rural women). In social
network theory, strong ties in social networks are used to explain
relationships among people with similar social identities, who are
relatively equal, and who share common bonds, such as profession,
ethnicity, family, status, and even recreational interest. Emotional
bonds of friendship, intimacy, and reciprocity often characterize such
relationships, and they tend to endure over time (Ashman et al.,
1998; Granovetter, 1973). Most microcredit NGOs in Sub-Saharan
Africa, however, have to manage relationships that are characterized
as weak ties, which are less frequent, more instrumental, and less
intimate; they are most common among those who are unequal and
heterogeneous in their social identities (Ashman et al., 1998;
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Putnam, 1993; Blau, 1994; Ibarra, 1993). According to Ashman et
al. (1998), people with different values, interests, degrees of power,
and ways of interacting often find it difficult to identify common
bonds that build trust. Their relationships are more likely than
strong-tie relationships to be threatened by conflicts or domination,
unless the parties can learn ways of overcoming their differences
through mechanisms such as friendship (Uphoff, 1992), intermediaries who perform bridging roles (Brown, 1993), or participatory
decision making (Brown & Ashman, 1996). However, weak ties that
connect otherwise socially isolated groups have been noted for their
capacity to bring new information and resources that would otherwise
not be accessible (Granovetter, 1973).
If microcredit institutions are too homogeneous and overassociated with either the resource-generating or grant-making environment, they can fail to bridge the two environments effectively and
risk becoming irrelevant to their own missions. Overalignment with
the perspectives of poor and marginalized constituencies can lead
to alienation from the priorities of financial resource donors and
managers, which in turn leads to the declining availability of funds
for microcredit. But overcompliance with the demands of donors
and financial managers for certain kinds of projects, strict financial
accountability, and quantifiable results of social development projects
can lead to grant-making relationships that are perceived by recipients
to be controlling rather than supportive of their own developmental
priorities and processes.

The Politicization of Microcredit Organizations
The relationships between NGOs and governments in Africa are
difficult to characterize. NGOs can either choose to isolate themselves completely from the state, engage the state through advocacy
(confrontational or nonconfrontational), or cooperate with the state
through parallel or collaborative field projects (Fisher, 1998).
According to Fisher (2003), in a world increasingly beset by
famines, wars, genocide, AIDS, environmental deterioration, and
continuing population momentum in poor countries, the failed
state has become the Achilles heel of the emerging international
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community. For every failed state there are many more “weakly
institutionalized” governments. To be both accountable and strong,
government at the national level must intersect, at least indirectly,
with the efforts ordinary people make in their communities. Weak
states, pushed by international forces advocating structural adjustment and privatization, are now partnering with NGOs, who are
now acquiring growing capacity, in order to avoid social unrest.
Fisher (2003) also asserts that in Senegal, during the early
1980s, the government began using grassroots support organizations
(GRSOs) to increase its access to rural areas and reduce the power of
the marabouts, or Islamic brotherhoods. Ironically, because this
threatened NGO autonomy, a GRSO network was developed and
led a long and complicated legal fight to forestall government intervention, thereby creating an NGO-marabout alliance.
In the context of the theories of social capital, the strength of
ties, and the politicization of NGOs (including microcredit institutions), this article compares 10 microcredit organizations in a small
rural town in Senegal to see how they managed their relationships
with northern NGOs and governments; to consider the challenge of
building social capital across the different environments of northern
NGOs, donors, and governments; and to examine their constituency
of poor rural women. The article also explores the role played by the
founders or heads of these organizations, investigating how the social
capital they managed to accumulate has influenced the effectiveness
and resources of their microcredit institutions and whether this has
translated into socioeconomic development for the community.

Methodology
The objective of this research is to examine microcredit activity in
the community and the impact of that activity on the building of
social capital. Research included socioeconomic surveys and semistructured interviews on social capital and microcredit institutions
in Gossas. The authors decided to focus on the more established
groupements in order to better understand how they operate and
their impact on social capital.
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Ethnographic research was conducted over a period of three
years, with one of the authors living in the community as a Peace
Corps volunteer in the town of Gossas, Senegal, for two years. The
other authors have traveled to Senegal and the Gambia to conduct
research on this topic three times in the last two years, their time there
totaling three months. Research included socioeconomic surveys
and semistructured interviews on social capital and microcredit
institutions in Gossas.
An ethnographic study was chosen as the most appropriate
methodology, as the results of microcredit programs can be better
understood using in-depth analysis of the social processes and economic histories of the communities impacted.

Economic Activities in
the Peanut Basin of Senegal
The Study Area
Senegal, the country where this research was conducted, is located in
West Africa. The capital of Senegal, Dakar, is the westernmost point
in Africa. The country, which is slightly smaller than South Dakota,

Figure 1. Map of Senegal

Source: http://www.mapquest.com
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surrounds the Gambia on three sides; it is bordered on the north by
Mauritania, on the east by Mali, and on the south by Guinea and
Guinea-Bissau. Senegal is mainly a low-lying country, with a semidesert area in the north and northeast and forests in the southwest.
With a population of about 10.85 million, a literacy rate of 40%, and
a GDP per capita of US$446, Senegal was ranked 156th in 2002
by the United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) Human
Development Report. Senegal has been subjected to IMF and
World Bank Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) and in 1994 had
a devaluation of its currency (Franc CFA). In 2005, 54% of the
population lives below the poverty line. Senegal also has a high
unemployment rate, with almost half of its population unemployed. This unemployment is most acute among the youths (CIA
World Factbook, 2003).4

Economic Activities
Senegal’s primary rural economic activity is agriculture. Approximately 70% of the country’s workforce is involved in agriculture, and
in 2000 agriculture accounted for 18% of the GDP. The two main
agricultural activities in Senegal are peanut (groundnut) production
and fishing. Peanut production takes place on 40% of cultivated
land and employs over 1 million people, although it now accounts
for a smaller portion of foreign exchange earnings when compared
to fishing and mining (US$79.4 million in 2000). Most farms are
smallholdings where family supplies all of the labor. Over 70% of
agricultural production in Senegal comes from small and mediumsized enterprises.5
Fishing employs over 200,000 people full-time; in addition, it
provides considerable temporary employment in the informal sector
through small-scale traditional fishing. In 2000, fishing earned
US$239 million. In addition to providing income, fish is also the
dominant animal protein in the Senegalese diet.
Ethnographic research was conducted in Gossas, one of the three
departmental capitals in the region of Fatick. Foundiougne and
Fatick are the other departmental capitals. The primary ethnic groups
are Wolof, Sereer, and Pulaar. The population is approximately
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10,000. Gossas is on the national road between Kaolack and
Diourbel. Because of its location (between two regional capitals—
albeit not its own), Gossas is often marginalized with regards to
resources available in the region, and there is very little NGO activity
in Gossas. In order to get to the regional capital of Fatick, it is necessary to take a car 39 km to Kaolack and then take another car to
Fatick. The essential economic activities in Gossas are agriculture and
animal husbandry. Located in the “peanut basin,” the area produces
principally peanuts, millet, sorghum, and corn.
During the colonial era, peanut production was high and
Gossas was a thriving town. There are several old French colonial
buildings in the town, many of which are now deteriorated and
crumbling. Due to both the increased salinity of the water supply
and the depletion of minerals in the soil, peanut production and
overall economic health of the town have declined over the years.

Gender Relations and Financial Resources
of Sene-Gambian Women
Gender relations in Senegalese families are generally very patriarchal.
Senegalese women may appear to have a lot of power because of
their animated nature and dynamism. Women do have some power,
but just within their spheres of influence—namely, the raising of
children; and even with regard to this, their authority can be questioned by the borom kerr (male head of household). Typically, women
who contribute financially to the family enjoy greater freedom and
influence. And the first wife is more influential than the others.
However, ultimately the male makes the final decisions concerning
the affairs of the family.
In Gossas, wives must ask for permission to travel. If a wife does
not have her own income, she is not at liberty to make decisions
about the schooling and health care of the children. Family law in
Senegal is also very patriarchal. Husbands are automatically given tax
breaks for their dependent children, even if the wife works and even
if the husband and wife are divorced and she provides financially for
the children. The children are believed to always belong to their
fathers. However, as Perry (2002) notes, neoliberal reforms have
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diminished men’s power in domestic spheres. In rural areas, male
household heads were the official members of cooperatives and therefore lost a major source of patronage when cooperatives were abolished
in the 1980s under the auspices of structural adjustment programs
administered by the World Bank and IMF. Men’s inability to provide
their wives with peanut seed or to pay for much needed household
essentials forces them to concede to women’s wants and demands.
Although most of the inhabitants in the study area (Gossas) are
Muslims, Wolof farmers do not practice purdah (the seclusion of
women), and Wolof women have traditionally enjoyed some freedom
to pursue such income-generating activities as cash-crop farming
and livestock rearing. Wolof women do not generally pool their
finances with their husbands’. This is evident not only in rural
Senegal but even in the USA, where great numbers have emigrated
to in the last three decades. The authors note that even in western
settings, many Senegalese women do not own joint accounts with
their husbands. Babou supported this point (2002) when he studied
Senegalese Murid 6 Muslims in New York. Babou found that women
refused to participate in household expenses, citing Wolof and Islamic
traditions that exclusively assigned the financing of household
responsibilities to men.
Peddling among rural Wolof women is a common practice, and
weekly rural markets open up new avenues to spawn small businesses.
Perry (2002) contends that, as opposed to largely held assumptions
about West African women, who are commonly depicted as “market
mammies” and avid traders, Wolof women joined their more marketsavvy counterparts from Nigeria, Benin, and Sierra Leone, in recent
years. Even though this observation is true, the authors are of the
opinion that women in the Sene-Gambia region have increased their
numbers in trading not only locally but internationally. Women from
the Sene-Gambia region are now traveling to the Middle East and
North Africa (Dubai, Tunis, Morocco, Turkey, etc.) and to the Far
East (Shanghai, India, China, etc.), and they are radically changing
their communities.
The authors wish to emphasize that economic migrants from
Sub-Saharan Africa (estimated at 35% of the highly trained and
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skilled workforce) to developed countries are also responsible for
meeting the void left by failed states and neoliberal reforms pushed
forward through the “Washington consensus.” Communities would
have collapsed and died of hunger without the joint efforts of women
at the home front and economic migrants (both men and women) in
developed countries sending remittances to meet school, housing,
food, and health expenditures. Remittances to Senegal through
formal channels were estimated by the World Bank at CFA 127 billion in 2001. This amount should be trebled in order to capture the
informal remittances, making a total of CFA 381 billion (US$0.762
billion). The authors’ observation is substantiated by Jettinger
(2005), who states that
remittances are not only sent out of a moral obligation towards
the family in Senegal, but are essential in guaranteeing a family’s
livelihood. These regular remittances developed as a result of
the increasing social and economic problems in Senegal (such as
drought, structural adjustment programs, and devaluation of
the Franc CFA), and the changing immigration policies in the
countries of residence. (p. 14)
In urban Sene-Gambia, women are building social capital by
joining associations or microcredit organizations and jointly sponsoring one or two members to go overseas and buy goods (clothing,
expensive lace and sequin materials, insulated food containers, gold
jewelry, scarves, incense, perfumes, stainless steel and porcelain
cookware and bowls, etc.) on behalf of each individual group member.
Goods are put in freight containers and distributed to the individual
members of the group. These people in turn distribute to their own
intermediaries to sell for cash and on credit. The middle women and
men are then responsible for collecting monthly payments. The
intermediaries put a margin on top of their “patron’s” asking price to
serve as their commission for the distribution of goods and the collection of debts. In rural areas we see less elaborate activities and
goods, but women still trade in incense, palm oil, fish, locally sewn
clothes, etc. In the Gambia, which is only three hours away from
Gossas by car, most goods are substantially cheaper than in Senegal,
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due to lower import taxes. Women in Gossas are taking advantage of
this difference in price by regularly sending women to the Gambia to
buy fabric, clothes, shoes, sugar, flour, chicken, etc., to be distributed
to other groupement members and sold in the community.

Microcredit Alliances in Gossas, Rural Senegal
The first formal groupement (association or group) in Gossas was
created 20 years ago. In 2005, there are more than 50 groupements in
Gossas, a town of 10,000 people. The average membership is 30
women. Microcredit has become particularly important to women in
the agrarian-based rural economy of Senegal due to major institutional changes. Senegal, like many developing countries, entered into
structural adjustment programs in the early 1980s with the Bretton
Woods Institutions, bringing about neoliberal reforms such as the
abolition of state-led agricultural cooperatives throughout rural
Senegal. This means that farmers can no longer get the plows, seed
drills, fertilizer, or high quality seed they used to receive on credit
(Perry, 2002).
In recent years, NGOs from developing countries have been providing financing to microcredit institutions in developing countries.
In Gossas, Alliance de Credit et D’Epargne pour la Production
(ACEP [Credit and Savings Alliance for Production]), an American
NGO, has identified 15 groupements to receive financing. The 15
most dynamic member organizations of the Consortium (Gossas’s
most powerful federation of women’s groups) were chosen. Loans to
the groupements vary widely but range from CFA 250,000 to CFA
950,000 (US$500 to US$1,900). (Most groupements hold tontines in
addition to their lending activities.)
Notably, many groupements were formed between 2000 and the
present, with several being formed in the year that Mr. Abdoulaye
Wade, the current president of Senegal, was elected. Furthermore, it
is no coincidence that the Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (PDS) headquarters (Wade’s party) is also where the Consortium holds meetings.
Through federations, associations, and alliances, participants
synchronize their efforts and resources. NGOs are now forming
more alliances by reducing their insularity, largely because of the
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realization that they cannot do (or be) everything, and they now
accept a holistic view calling for complementary action with others.
Yet other more strategically oriented alliances occur to achieve
micro-macro complementarities (Fowler, 1997). At the grassroots
level, women’s economic groups are creating alliances that allow
them to reach greater economies of scale, heighten their political
clout, and realize greater opportunities and profits.
In Gossas, microcredit institutions formed alliances to reduce
redundancy, to maximize their impact, and to have a stronger political voice. There are three federations or alliances of associations
(groupement federation) in Gossas. Gossas has approximately 50
groupements, which fall under 3 different umbrella organizations.
With 49 member groupements, the Consortium of Gossas is the most
dynamic of these umbrella organizations. The Consortium was
started in 2001 and became a recognized organization in 2002.
Presidents of Consortium-member groupements meet monthly to
repay loans and to discuss opportunities, policies, and politics.
When the Consortium was started, each member of each
groupement was required to pay CFA 650 (US$1.30), of which CFA
150 (US$0.30) went to administrative fees (copying identity cards
and notarizing documents). The consortium initially started with 20
groupements and approximately 500 members (often women are
involved in more than one groupement). At its inception, the organization had CFA 270,000 (US$540) in operating funds. In November
2004, the Consortium had CFA 2 million (US$4,000) in its bank
account. Their account was strengthened by CFA 207,000
(US$414) from the government, which groupements in Gossas were
given following the visit of Prime Minister Macky Sall’s wife to
Gossas in 2003.

Gossas Groupement Structure and Governance
Generally every groupement has a president, vice president, treasurer,
and secretary. Money is collected only during meetings of the entire
group. Generally, money is collected in a pot, and each transaction
is verbally accounted for and then recorded in a book by the secretary. For example, one will take the money of a member and loudly
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say for all to hear, “Fatou Ndiaye 1,000 CFA,” after which the transaction will be recorded in a book. After money is collected, it is then
disbursed to members who will get loans during that meeting.
Money saved by the groupement may be deposited in the community
savings bank. Many groups have accounts at the savings bank. The
treasurer and the president usually have access to these funds.
As indicated by the interviews, all groups have a protocol for the
enforcement of rules regarding repayment. Fines, social pressure, and
the threat of being kicked out of the group are all means employed to
ensure that women repay their loans. One groupement indicated that
they would not hesitate to take nonpaying members to the police.

Lending Structure of the Consortium
Every month, each groupement president is given CFA 40,000
(US$80.00) to lend out to members of their groupement. The interest
rate is 10% over a two-month period. In the first month, groupement
presidents must come to the Consortium meeting with the interest
payment of CFA 4,000 (US$4), and the second month they must
pay back the complete CFA 40,000 (US$80). With the continuing
growth of the organization, it is difficult to continue giving 40,000
per member out of Consortium funds. Therefore, new member
groupements are limited to monthly loans of CFA 20,000 (US$40).
The Consortium also has a tontine each month for whoever wants to
participate. Each participant contributes CFA 2,500 (US$5) into the
pot, and two people are selected to win the money. If members do
not pay their loans back on time, there is a CFA 1,000 (US$2) late
fee. The groupement structure in Gossas is shown in Figure 2.
As a result of the political acumen of the groupements, in
November 1994, in a townwide meeting at the mayor’s office of
Gossas, the government of Senegal committed to providing CFA
40,000,000 (US$80,000) for loans to women’s groupements in the
department of Gossas. These loans can be individual loans or group
loans. The disbursement of loans began in early 2005. The largest
individual loan is CFA 250,000 (US$500) and the largest group loan
is CFA 2,500,000 (US$5,000). The loans are being given at 5%
interest, payable over a 12-month period, with a 3-month grace
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Figure 2. Structure of Associations in Gossas

Regional
Federation
Departmental
Federation

Communal Group

Individual Group
period before beginning payment. Women are required to fill out
applications detailing their plans for the money and a strategy for
repayment. Based on this information, the best projects are being
chosen to receive loans. Table 1 shows the most active microcredit
institutions in Gossas. Membership varies from 30 to 300 members;
longevity also varies, from 1 year to 18 years. Two of the groups are
receiving ACEP microcredit loans. The loan amounts, interest rates,
and penalties vary from one group to another.

Anatomy of Social Capital
Amongst Gossas Groupements
This section seeks to identify patterns in the formation and overall
standing of microcredit organizations in Gossas, as well as their access
to resources. Even though we cannot draw firm conclusions about the
patterns identified in this research, such an exercise is very insightful
to researchers and practitioners by pinpointing the “necessary” factors
propelling microcredit organizations to have greater impact. This
section assesses the development of social capital by the founders and
138

Volume 7 Number 1

Table 1. The Most Active Microcredit Institutions in Gossas
Bokk Ndeye ak Baye‡
(Sharing same mother and father—portraying closeness of group)
• Year of Commencement: 1984
• Number of members: 300
• Initial start-up financing: Started with member funds. Each person contributed
CFA 100 (US$0.20).
• Loan terms: Max.: CFA 50,000 (US$100) is both the maximum loan and the
average loan.
• Interest rate & penalties: The interest rate is 10%, and the duration of the loan
is four to five months. There is a late fee of CFA 100 per day.
• Microenterprises that members are engaged in: Members have businesses doing
tie dying and tailoring and selling vegetables, fabric, household goods, etc.
Diakhao*
• Year of Commencement: 1987
• Number of members: 30
• Initial start-up financing: Tontine to defray the costs of the baptism and CFA
5,000 (US$10) for themselves.
• Loan terms: Dues: CFA 50/wk; Max.: CFA 3,000 (US$6); Min.: CFA 2,000
(US$4); Ave.: CFA 2,500 (US$5)
• Interest rate & penalties: 10%, payable over two months. First month: interest
due, second month: principal due
• Microenterprises that members are engaged in: Members sell vegetables,
churaye (incense), cloth, shoes, and household items.
Takku Liggeey Diakhao
(Stand steadfast and build Diakhao)
• Year of Commencement: 1996
• Number of members: 65
• Initial start-up financing: Started with member funds of CFA 1,000 (US$2) each.
• Loan terms: Max.: CFA 5,000 (US$10) Min.: CFA 2,500 (US$5)
• Interest rate & penalties: The interest rate is 5%, and the loans are paid back
the next month.
• Microenterprises that members are engaged in: Most members sell food items
in the market. They sell vegetables, dried fish, millet, etc.
Bokk Jomm
(Together in pride)
• Year of Commencement: 2001
• Number of members: 30
• Initial start-up financing: Started with the funds of group members. They put
in CFA 500 each to get things started and each donate CFA 100 every month.
• Loan terms: Max.†: CFA 100,000 (US$200) Min.: CFA 50,000 (US$100)
• Interest rate & penalties: 25%, payable over five months. Members are given a
three to four month grace period. After the grace period is over, they must
make a payment equal to 20% of the loan and 25% of the total interest
payment. For example, on a loan of CFA 50,000, member will pay 12,500 per
month for a total of 62,500 repaid over the life of the loan.
• Microenterprises that members are engaged in: Members own boutiques, sell
vegetables in the market, and generally engage in all types of petty commerce,
i.e., buying fabric, jewelry, perfume, etc. to resell. Members also farm and sell
their produce—mostly millet.

Dangou Lebou
• Year of Commencement: 2001
• Number of members: 60
• Initial start-up financing: Started with member funds. Each member gave an
initial contribution of CFA 100 (US$0.20).
• Loan terms: Max.: CFA 10,000 (US$20) Min.: CFA 5,000 (US$10.00) 80%
repayment rate.
• Interest rate & penalties: The interest rate is 5%, and the duration of the loan
is two months.
• Microenterprises that members are engaged in: Members have businesses doing
tie dying and tailoring and selling vegetables, fabric, household goods, etc.
Doleel Jaboot
• Year of Commencement: 2001
• Number of members: 33
• Initial start-up financing: Started with member funds. Each member gave an
initial contribution of CFA 500 (US$1.00).
• Loan terms: Max.: CFA 15,000 (US$30.00) Min.: CFA 2,500 (US$5.00)
• Interest rate & penalties: The interest rate is 5%, and the duration of the loan
is 1 month for every CFA 5,000 borrowed. For example, if a member borrows
CFA 10,000, the duration of the loan is two months. 100% repayment rate.
Fine of CFA 150 (US$0.30) per day for late payment.
• Microenterprises that members are engaged in: Members have businesses doing
tie dying and tailoring and selling vegetables, fabric, household goods, etc.
Kai Fii**
(Come here)
• Year of Commencement: 2001
• Number of members: 45
• Initial start-up financing: Groupement was started with member funds. Each
member contributed CFA 500. Every three months, every member must
contribute CFA 500. In November they received funds from ACEP.
• Loan terms: With the funds contributed by groupement members: Max.: CFA
15,000 (US$30) Min.: CFA 10,000 (US$10). With the funds the groupement
received from ACEP: Max.: CFA 50,000 (US$100), Min.: CFA 25,000
(US$50)
• Interest rate & penalties: The duration of these loans is one month at 5%
interest. 13%, payable over 12 months. Two-month grace period.
• Microenterprises that members are engaged in: Members own boutiques, sell
vegetables in the market, and generally engage in all types of petty commerce,
i.e., buying fabric, jewelry, perfume, etc. to resell.
Takku Liggeey Dangou
(Stand steadfast and work for Dangou*)
• Year of Commencement: 2001
• Number of members: 48
• Initial start-up financing: Started with member funds.
• Loan terms: Max.: CFA 40,000 is both the maximum and average loan.
• Interest rate & penalties: 10%, and the duration of the loan is three months.
• Microenterprises that members are engaged in: Members have businesses doing
tie-dying, raising chickens, selling vegetables, and all types of petty commerce,
i.e., buying fabric, jewelry, perfume, etc. to resell. The groupement also owns a
millet machine.

Bunkard
• Year of Commencement: 2002
• Number of members: 32
• Initial start-up financing: Started with member funds. Each member
contributed CFA 650 to start.
• Loan terms: Max.: CFA 25,000 (US$50), which is also the average loan.
• Interest rate & penalties: 5%, and the duration is 2 months.
• Microenterprises that members are engaged in: Most members are involved in
some form of petty commerce, i.e., buying items for resale in Gossas.
Funkal Sa Cherie
(Revere your husband)
• Year of Commencement: 2003
• Number of members: 70
• Initial start-up financing: Started with member funds.
• Loan terms: Max.: CFA 15,000 (US$30) Min.: CFA 10,000 (US$20). When
the groupement started, the maximum loan was CFA 2,000. When they had
enough money for each member to be able to borrow 2,000, they moved the
maximum loan to 5,000. They will continue this upward progression
indefinitely. Currently, every member has a loan out of at least CFA 10,000,
and two members have a loan of CFA 15,000.
• Interest rate & penalties: 10%, and the duration of the loan is one month.
There is a penalty of CFA 500 per day for late payment.
• Microenterprises that members are engaged in: Members have businesses tiedying fabric, working in hair salons, and all types of petty commerce, i.e.,
buying fabric, jewelry, perfume, etc. to resell.
Sopp Sokna Mame Diarra Bousso
• Year of Commencement: November 2004
• Number of members: 33
• Initial start-up financing: ACEP
• Loan terms: Max.: CFA 100,000 (US$200); Min.: CFA 50,000 (US$100)
• Interest rate & penalties: 13%, payable over 12 months. 2 month grace period.
• Microenterprises that members are engaged in: Members own boutiques, sell
vegetables in the market, and generally engage in all types of petty commerce,
i.e., buying fabric, jewelry, perfume, etc. to resell.
* Name of a town
** The founder is a dynamic change agent in Gossas. She was largely responsible for
ACEP choosing to finance Gossas groupements and is the point person for the
project. She keeps track of all ACEP loans made in Gossas. She is also the
secretary general for the Consortium of groupements in the town and the
federation of groupements at the departmental level.
† A member receiving an initial loan of CFA 50,000 (US$100) must borrow and
successfully repay a loan of CFA 50,000 (US$100) five times in order to be
eligible for the next tier loan of CFA 65,000 (US$130). Then the member must
borrow and repay a loan of 65,000 successfully five times in order to be eligible
for a loan of CFA 100,000 (US$200).
‡ Bokk Ndeye ak Baye was the first groupement started in the commune of Gossas.
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leaders of Gossas groupements and evaluates its impact on women’s
political clout and their ability to garner financial and material
resources from the government of Senegal and the NGO community.
The founders of the microcredit organizations in this study are the
individuals and groups who played the most critical roles in the formation of the new organizations. They include the national, regional,
and local social leaders and groups who invested their ideas, time, and
resources in founding the organizations.
The authors observed that women, especially microcredit
founders and leaders, have built their social capital by allying with
the regime. They are thus using their political connections to get
access to northern NGOs, government financing, and grants. It is
therefore evident that these rural women have become more sophisticated in their dealings with government and are “banking” on the
political clout of their organization. This leverage is brought about
by these women arguing that “I carry X number of women who will
listen to my directives [voting and supporting the regime].”
Ties with government are assessed from the interviews performed
with microcredit organization presidents, founders, and members.
Gossas has a Social Development office, a regional office of the
Ministry of Family and Social Development. The director of the Social
Development Office is the point person for receiving government
financing; all proposals will go to the Minister of the Family and Social
Development from the director’s desk. It is this regional office that
supplies technical support to women’s economic groups in Gossas.
Regarding the awarding and distribution of the CFA 40,000,000
(US$8,000) government fund earmarked for groupements in the
department of Gossas, staff of this office were trained to provide support applicants and provide the winners of the funding with training
in accounting, record keeping, and the rules and regulations of the
financement. In 2004, the request for proposals for the new government financing was presented to the public at the mayor’s office. This
has been an arduous task for Social Development office staff. While
microcredit organizations have become very aggressive in their search
for more funding and have successfully wielded their social capital to
obtain greater funding opportunities, they often lack the vision and
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skills to work with greater sums of money. The following remark
made by a government official underscores this dilemma:
I am frustrated. When the women come to me for help, they not
only want me to help them type the proposals, they essentially
want me to write the proposals. They come with no clue of
what type of project they want to do and how they will manage the money. All they know is that they want more money.
(Interview Notes)
In the last year, vast changes have occurred on the politicaleconomic landscape for Gossas groupements. Before 2004, when
ACEP began to finance groupements, and 2003, when Prime Minister
Macky Sall’s wife introduced a fund, groupements in Gossas were
primarily self-financed. Women who have been accustomed to
receiving loans no larger than CFA 100,000 (US$200) are now able
to access loans that are over 10 times larger. Hence, these women are
experiencing growing pains as their dreams of greater financement
become a reality.
These realities notwithstanding, it is important to assess the
factors that have precipitated these new infusions of capital. How
were these women able to garner social capital and wield it to their
advantage in a town often overlooked in the distribution of resources,
also located in one of the poorest regions of Senegal?

Women’s Groupements in Sene-Gambia
and the Political Process
Women’s groupements form one of the most powerful voting blocs in
Senegal. Highly organized, these groups meet frequently and regularly, devise political strategy, and wield great power and influence
over politicians and government actors. In the town of Gossas alone,
which only has a population of ten thousand, there are close to 1,000
women who belong to a groupement. Women have been called on time
and time again to don their blue and gold boubous,7 the colors of the
Partie Democratique du Senegal (PDS), to go to rallies in support of
the PDS. For very significant rallies, women are often bussed in from
near and far. In 2004, women in the region of Fatick made their
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voices heard in vociferous support for the mayor of Fatick’s ascension
to prime minister of Senegal. Following Senegal’s independence celebration on April 4, 2004, amidst accusations of improper use of funds
designated for revitalization projects in the region of Thies, Prime
Minister Idrissa Seck was booted from the number two post. During
the controversy, President Abdoulaye Wade dissolved his cabinet and
changed several members. When the smoke cleared, it was Macky
Sall, the mayor of Fatick, who was standing in the country’s number
two political spot as prime minister of Senegal. The women of Fatick
and particularly the women of Gossas did not hesitate to use their
influence to realize economic benefits for groupements.
The leader of the Consortium, the most powerful groupement
federation in Gossas, is a charismatic woman well known and liked in
the community by both young and old. When the vice president of
the Consortium was asked about the role of politics in the activities
of groupements, she stated that “Groupements are more and more a
political thing. It is difficult to talk about development anymore
because everything is politicized.” When asked why the Consortium
is so strong, the vice president responded, “It’s the president, X; when
she walks down the street you hear children and old people chanting
her name. She worked very hard to have the prime minister’s wife
come here to Gossas.” The president of the Consortium is also very
active within the departmental and regional groupement federations
and was instrumental in persuading the wife of the newly appointed
prime minister, Macky Sall, to come to Gossas and commit funds to
Gossas groupements. At that meeting she committed CFA 207,000
(US$414) to the town of Gossas, and more was given to groupements
in the rural villages of the department of Gossas. The president’s success in persuading Sall’s wife to come to Gossas before going to the
other departments in the region further legitimized her status and
role as a powerful change agent capable of wielding the social capital
garnered by Gossas groupements to produce results.
Therefore, when assessing the relationship between microcredit
organizations or women’s groupements and government, the important question to ask is what social capital theory (Marxist or rational
choice) best captures the social capital exhibited by the people in our
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study site of Gossas. The authors are of the opinion that microcredit
organizations are using their political affiliations to get more support
from government and northern NGOs. As shown in Table 2, the
strength of ties and the politicization of the 10 microcredit organizations chosen is just developing. Out of the 10 organization studies,
3 have strong ties with northern NGOs (ACEP) and 1 has very strong
ties to the government. However, most of the microcredit organizations are tied to government since they are dipping or planning to
dip into microcredit funds administered by the Ministry of Family
and Social Development.

Impact of Microcredit in Gossas
In order to determine the impact of microcredit on the community,
we performed a process flow analysis of where the money goes—i.e.,
what is done with the loan money. Women in Gossas are primarily
engaged in economic activities such as selling foodstuff in the market
(fruit, vegetables, fish, etc.); selling clothes, shoes, and other consumer
items; hairdressing; and tailoring. When women receive loans, they use
the money to purchase inputs for their businesses and pay businessassociated fees. For example, the women who sell vegetables in the

Table 2. Microcredit Organizations and Scope of Ties
Microcredit
organization

Inception Year

Ties with
northern NGO

Bokk Ndeye ak Baye

1984

No

Diakhao

1987

Yes

Takku Liggeey Diakhao

1996

No

Bokk Jomm

2001

No

Dangou Lebou

2001

No

Doleel Jabot

2001

No

Kai Fii

2001

Yes*

Takku Liggeey Dangou

2001

No

Bunkard

2002

No

Funkal Sa Cherie

2003

No

Sopp Sokna Mame
Diarra Bousso

November 2004

Yes

* Kai Fii is also has strong ties to the government—it was founded by a political leader.
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market use their money to pay those that deliver vegetables, which
come from Cassamance and Guinea, and also to pay rent for their
stalls in the market. They use the money they earn to pay debts,
make business related purchases, and take care of familial obligations
(school fees, clothes, baptisms, marriages, etc.). While in Senegal the
finances of women are generally kept separate from those of their
husbands, women are often the ones who pay their children’s school
fees. In polygamous families, a husband may have four wives and
more than a dozen children. The expense of educating children is too
great for fathers to pay alone, and often the only way children are
educated is through the earnings of women. Women also spend a
substantial amount of money on the required gifts for baptisms and
marriages. Finally, Sene-Gambian women take particular pride in
their appearance and often spend substantial amounts of disposable
income on clothing. There are very little personal savings amongst
the women.
When the founders and some members of microcredit organizations were questioned on whether their lives have been significantly
changed by microcredit, the answers were not very convincing. Most
women accept that microcredit has impacted their lives, but not considerably. Figure 3 includes some of the statements given by the
women interviewed in November 2004.
As shown by these statements, microcredit institutions have
brought positive changes to this poor rural town of 10,000 inhabitants. However, the expectations portrayed in neoliberal development
discourse that microcredit and social capital will help lift communities out of poverty are a bit too optimistic. The abject poverty, lack of
social amenities, and deprivation suffered by rural communities as a
result of structural adjustment programs and failed states that we are
currently seeing all over the Sub-Saharan African landscape will take
more than microcredit to correct.

Conclusions
The general expectation of the impact of microcredit is largely due
to the interpretation of social norms and networks that underlies the
Grameen model of microfinance that is now widely promoted by
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mainstream development agencies. Drawing on liberal theories of
social capital, these interpretations expect that opportunities for
association afforded women through “solidarity groups” will foster
the social networks and common moral frameworks necessary for
cooperation and collective action (Rankin, 2002).
However, the authors are of the opinion that since its inception,
there has been much debate as to the merits of microcredit as a tool
of empowerment and poverty alleviation. High interest rates, low
rates of personal savings, and inaccessibility of higher levels of credit
and formal lending institutions are all factors that have been highlighted in this debate. The women of Gossas, Senegal, face all of these
obstacles. There was a common thread of empowerment vis-à-vis
husbands and communities, which was highlighted during interviews.

Figure 3. Statements from November 2004 Interviews
“We only just started. But [and she waves her hands towards her pots, where she
is preparing the night’s meal of millet couscous and dried fish] we are just trying to add
a little to our pots, dress a little better, and contribute more to our households.”
“I’ve seen especially how groupements have helped single women, women with no
husbands. Many of these women didn’t have enough even to eat for the day. It’s tough.
Gossas is a poor town. Now they have money to buy food and the things they need.”
“Yes and no. We now have a source of money when we need a loan. But the loans
are too small and we need more money. I would like to really expand my boutique, but
to do that I need a lot more money.”
“When we started this groupement, we had nothing—not one single CFA. Now we
have 350,000 CFA in our account, and it only keeps growing. Each member is up to
having a loan of at least 10,000 CFA. We are making great progress.”
“I initially started this groupement to bring greater unity and cohesion in our neighborhood. Through the activities of our groupement, we have learned unity in economics. Everyone is struggling to make it here. We are now struggling and working
together.”
“I definitely see the changes. If you can help your husband, this lifts your voice in
the household. He listens to you more.”
“It took a while for the women to understand how the groupement works and to
believe that they’d see real benefits. But now, things are running smoothly and everyone
sees the benefits.”
“Yes. Before, there was no one to borrow money from. Often, you just need a little money to get you through until the end of the month, a little money to buy your
merchandise and fill up your table. Before, when we fell short of money, there was no
one to turn to.”
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Women who contribute to the family financially enjoy greater freedom and influence. When asked if her standing within the family has
changed as a result of her earning income, one groupement president
stated, “I definitely see the changes. If you can help your husband,
this lifts your voice in the household. He listens to you more.” Within
the author’s host family, in the town of Gossas, this was quite apparent. Of the three wives, the wife who is a groupement president and
has had her own stand in the vegetable market enjoys the greatest
freedom and mobility. While, like the other wives, she must ask permission to travel before going anywhere, she is given permission to
travel more frequently. This wife is very involved politically and often
travels to rallies and meetings. The other wives, who are completely
financially dependant on the husband of the family, are not granted
permission as often, and it is evident that their voices do not carry as
much weight in the household. Furthermore, they are not at liberty
to make certain decisions regarding the schooling and welfare of their
children. The income-earning wife pays school fees for her children
and in some cases purchases their medicine when they are sick.
Whether the increased flow of microcredit to Gossas will have
significant socioeconomic impact is unclear. From the interviews
conducted, when asked to describe lessons learned, while some gave
concrete examples, most interviewees stated that their groupement
has operated essentially in the same manner since the beginning.
Members were also asked what they needed in order to advance or
improve their organization, and all answered, more financement.
None answered that they needed more training in any area. When
members were asked what would they do if they had more money,
only two people gave very detailed responses: to build a vegetable and
fruit processing business and to open stores; but the majority answered
that they would continue to buy more products to resell in Gossas.
It is evident from this case study that women are using microcredit organizations to organize and have more voice in politics.
Indeed, women in this small town of Gossas have played a role in
getting the mayor of their region elected as prime minister in Senegal
(Macky Sall) and in return have received some spoils from visits of
the prime minister’s wife, the establishment of a northern NGO
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offering microcredit loans, and microcredit loans from the Ministry of
Family and Social Development. The crucial question to investigate
in the very near future (2–3 years) is whether these benefits have
gelled together to propel the socioeconomic development of the
community or whether microcredit and social capital merely act as
“symbolic violence” binding the oppressed to their oppressors—the
state, multilaterals, bilaterals, and northern NGOs.

Notes
1. See Gladwin (1991), Buckley (1997), Abdulai and Delgado (1999), Mordoch
(2000), and Martin and Holme (2003).
2. A joint financial arrangement in which members contribute monthly or weekly a
set amount, and the entire amount collected is awarded to one participant at a time. Each
participant gets a chance to be awarded the entire amount collected per week or month.
3. Weekly or monthly meetings that fulfill religious as well as secular purposes.
Diaras are used for educational purposes (recitation of the Quran and sermons) but also
for socialization purposes.
4. See http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/inimr-ri.nsf/en/gr110237e.html
5. These estimates are from 2001.
6. An Islamic sect or brotherhood in Senegal founded by Amadu Bamba Mbakke
around the 1890s. Scholars of the Muridiyya interpret the brotherhood as a response of
the Wolof to the structural changes brought about by colonization and the introduction
of a market economy (Babou, 2002, p. 152).
7. Boubous are long flowing garments consisting of a wrap skirt and shirt with a
head scarf traditionally worn by Sene-Gambian women.

References
Abudulai, A., & Delgado, C. L. (1999). Determinants of nonfarm earnings of farmbased husbands and wives in Northern Ghana. American Journal of Agricultural
Economics, 81, 117–130.
Ackerly, B. (1997). What’s in a design? The effects of NGO programme delivery choices
on women’s empowerment in Bangladesh. In A. M. Goetz (Ed.), Getting the
institutions right for women in development (pp. 140–60). New York: Zed Books.
Ashman, D., Brown, D., & Zwick, E. (1998). The strength of strong and weak ties:
Building social capital for the formation and governance of civil society resource
organizations. Nonprofit Management & Leadership, 9(2), 153–171.
Babou, C. A. (2002). Brotherhood solidarity, education and migration: The role of the
dahira among the murid community of New York. African Affairs, 101, 151–170.

Volume 7 Number 1

149

Journal of Microfinance
Buckley, G. (1997). Micro finance in Africa: Is it either the problem or the solution?
World Development 25(7), 1081–1093.
Brown, L. D. (1993). Development bridging organizations and strategic management
for social change. Advances in Strategic Management, 9, 391–405.
Brown, L. D., & Ashman, D. (1996). Participation, social capital, and intersectoral
problem-solving: African and Asian cases. World Development, 24(9), 1467–1479.
Blau, P. (1994). The structural contexts of opportunities. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Bourdieu, P. (1977). Outline of a theory of practice. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
CIA—The World Factbook 2003—Senegal. (n.d.). Retrieved March 24, 2005, from
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/sg.html
Edwards, M. (n.d.). Enthusiasts, technicians and skeptics: The World Bank, civil society and social capital. Retrieved August 7, 2001, from www.worldbank.org/
poverty/scapital/library/Edwards.pdf
Fisher, J. (1998). NGOs and the political development of the third world. West Hartford,
CT: Kumarian Press.
Fisher, J. (2003). Local and global: International governance and civil society. Journal of
International Affairs, 57(1), 19–39.
Fowler, A. (1997). Striking a balance: A guide to enhancing the effectiveness of non-governmental organisations in international development. London: Earthscan Publications.
Fukuyama, F. (1996). Trust: Social capital and the global economy. Current, 379, 12–18.
Gladwin, C. H. (Ed) (1991). Structural adjustment and African women farmers.
Gainesville: University of Florida Press.
Goetz, A. M. (1997). Local heroes: Patterns of fieldworker discretion in implementing
GAD policy in Bangladesh. In A. M. Goetz (Ed.), Getting the institutions right
for women in development (pp. 161–75). New York: Zed Books.
Goonewardena, K. (2000). The future of planning at the end of history. Unpublished
manuscript, University of Toronto.
Granovetter, M. (1973). The strength of weak ties. American Journal of Sociology, 78,
1360–1380.
Ibarra, H. (1993). Personal networks of women and minorities in management: A
conceptual framework. Academy of Management Review, 18(2), 56–87.
Jessop, B. (1994). Post-Fordism and the state. In A. Amin (Ed.), Post-Fordism: A reader
(pp. 251–79). Boston, MA: Blackwell.
Jettinger, B. (2005). Senegal country study: A part of the report on informal remittance
systems in Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries (ref: R02CS008).
Oxford: UK.
Kabeer, N. (1994). Reversed realities: Gender hierarchies in development thought. New
York: Verso.

150

Volume 7 Number 1

Microcredit, Social Capita l, and Politics
Koretz, G. (2001, July 23). Why Americans grow apart: Behind the fraying social fabric. Business Week, 30.
Matin, I. & Hulme, D. (2003). Programs for the poorest: Learning from the IGVGD
program in Bangladesh. World Development, 31(3), 647–665.
Mayer, M. (2001). Transformations in urban struggles: From “social movement” to
“social capital”? Paper presented at the June 2001 conference of the Research
Committee on Urban and Regional Development of the International
Sociological Association, “Social Inequality, Redistributive Justice and the City,”
Amsterdam.
Morduch, J. (2000). Analysis of the effects of microfinance on poverty reduction. NYU
Wagner Working Paper Series. Robert F. Wagner Graduate School of Public
Service, New York University.
Morduch, J. (2000). The microfinance schism. World Development, 28(4), 617–629.
Perry, D. (2002). Microcredit and women moneylenders: The shifting terrain of credit
in rural Senegal. Human Organization, 61(1), 30–40.
Putnam, R. (1993). Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Putnam, R. (1995). Bowling alone: America’s declining social capital. Journal of
Democracy, 3(January), 65–78.
Rankin, K. N. (2001). Governing development: Neoliberalism, microcredit, and rational economic woman. Economy and Society, 30(1), 18–37.
Rankin, K. N. (2002). Social capital, microfinance and the politics of development.
Feminist Economics, 8(1), 1–24.
Uphoff, N. (1992). Learning from Gal Oya. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Woolcock, M. (1998). Social capital and economic development: Toward a theoretical
synthesis and policy framework. Theory and Society, 27, 151–208.

Volume 7 Number 1

151

Journal of Microfinance

152

Volume 7 Number 1

